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Abstract 
We study spatial competition in two-sided markets, in which platforms engage in price competition in a circular city. 
After analyzing the pricing and profits of the unique symmetric equilibrium for a given number of platforms, we derive 
the number of platforms under free entry and compare it with the social optimum. We consider the case with or 
without a price restriction. In contrast to the excess entry result in Salop's (1979) model, the number of platforms is 
smaller than the social optimum if a minimum price binds, and if cross-group network effects are sufficiently large for 
a group of agents.
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     1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are markets in which intermediate service providers, or platforms,a r e
required for two groups of agents to transact with an opponent. These mar-
kets are two-sided markets. Examples of two-sided markets include the mag-
azine market (readers and advertisers), the classiﬁeds markets (i.e., yellow
pages) (users and ﬁrms), the nightclub market (men and women), and the
telecommunications market (callers and receivers), among others.1 In these
markets, a platform attracts groups of agents and promotes transactions in
order to generate a surplus. Central issues include how platforms behave and
how the results aﬀect welfare.
Competition that is limited to two platforms has been studied previously
(see Armstrong 2006, Armstrong and Wright 2007 and Anderson and Coate
2005). If a potential entrant ﬁnds it proﬁtable to enter, entry should occur,
and it is natural to consider entry and competition among many platforms.2
Accordingly, we investigate competition among three or more platforms by
adopting Salop’s (1979) circular city model, which adopts a game theory
framework. First, platforms simultaneously decide whether to enter, and en-
tering platforms are symmetrically set t l e di nac i r c l e . I nt h es e c o n ds t a g e ,
those platforms set membership prices for two groups of agents, sellers and
buyers, who are uniformly located on the circle. In the third stage, sellers
and buyers simultaneously choose whether to join, at most, one platform or
not. The agent’s payoﬀ consists of membership fees, transportation costs,
and utility from cross-group network eﬀects. Cross-group network eﬀects
are deﬁned as the positive externality from the number of the other group’s
agents who join the same platform.3 We derive a unique symmetric sub-
game perfect equilibrium for a given number of platforms. We discuss how
the equilibrium price for buyers and sellers is aﬀected by cross-group network
eﬀects of sellers and buyers, respectively. If cross-group network eﬀects of
sellers are larger than that of buyers, platforms are in greater price compe-
1Free magazines and newspapers have been growing in Japan. About 40
percent of free magazine and newspaper operations were launched in the 2000s
(http://www.jafna.or.jp/freepaper/freepaper 3.html). Magazines provide readers with em-
ployment information, such as job openings. Therefore, magazines connect readers and
ﬁrms that need workers.
2With the exceptions of price restriction and multihoming, Armstrong and Wright
(2007) are the same as Armstrong (2006). Anderson and Coate (2005) investigate the
competition between two broadcasting platforms with negative cross-group network eﬀects.
They discuss the conditions in which one or two platforms are in the market.
3Cross-group network eﬀects are evident in many two-sided markets. In magazines,
readers appreciate a greater number of job openings, whereas ﬁrms that post job openings
value a magazine’s employment classiﬁeds if it has a larger reader base.
1tition for buyers and extract a surplus from sellers, because platforms can
attract many sellers by obtaining one buyer. After analyzing the equilibrium,
we derive the number of platforms under conditions of free entry. Free entry
in two-sided markets has never been discussed. Compared with the social
optimum, there are an excess number of entering platforms. This result is
an extension of Salop (1979) and Navon et al. (1995).
Platforms set a negative equilibrium price for buyers, for example, if the
cross-group network eﬀects of sellers are suﬃciently large. However, setting
negative prices may not be feasible. We thus consider the case in which
price is restricted by a lower boundary, such as the case of non-negative
prices.4 This restriction is considered in Armstrong and Wright (2007) and
Anderson and Coate (2005). To see how price restriction aﬀects equilibrium
behavior, consider a seller’s price that is bound by a minimum price. This
restriction limits each platform’s ability to attract sellers by lowering prices.
This induces platforms to reduce prices for buyers in order to attract sellers
through cross-group network eﬀects. Therefore, the equilibrium price for
sellers (buyers) is higher (lower) than that without the restriction. The eﬀect
on proﬁts is ambiguous. However, whether each platform’s proﬁti n c r e a s e s
depends on the relative size of the proﬁt increase from sellers and the proﬁt
decrease from buyers.
With price restrictions, we also derive the number of platforms under
free entry. We ﬁnd that the number of platforms is smaller than the so-
cial optimum, if the minimum price binds and cross-group network eﬀects
are suﬃciently large for a group of agents.5 Under these conditions, platform
proﬁts are considerably reduced, because an increase of proﬁtf r o mo n eg r o u p
is smaller than a decrease of proﬁtf r o mt h eo t h e rg r o u p .A ne n t e r i n gp l a t -
f o r mc a ne a r ns m a l l e rp r o ﬁts and thus has fewer incentives to enter, therefore
resulting in a lower propensity to enter.
In section 2, we set up the model of two-sided markets with many plat-
forms and derive equilibria given the number of platforms. Section 3 analyzes
the consequences of free entry. Section 4 concludes.
4In this model, we can also consider maximum prices. An example of a maximum price
is a price cap. Regulators impose price caps on telecommunications companies to provide
incentives for cost reduction (see Laﬀont and Tirole 2000).
5In addition, if the maximum price binds and cross-group network eﬀects are suﬃciently
large for sellers, excess entry is generated, because the cross-group network eﬀects intensify
proﬁts from buyers.
22M o d e l
There are m ≥ 3 homogeneous platforms. Each platform is located equidis-
tant from each other on the unit circle. There are two groups of agents,
sellers (S)a n db u y e r s( B). Each agent is distributed uniformly on the circle
and needs to join a platform to meet an agent from the other side. In this
model, assume that each agent joins one platform. To join the platform,
each agent incurs transportation costs per unit of distance tk > 0, k = S,B.
An agent who joins the platform obtains cross-group network beneﬁts bk > 0
multiplied by the number of other side agents who join the same platform.










k is the price to join platform i and ni
j is the number of agents in
group j, j 6= k.T h ea g e n tf r o mg r o u pk receives suﬃciently large common
beneﬁts ak when that agent joins a platform.
G i v e nt h a te a c ha g e n tp a r t i c i p a t e si nap l a t f o r m ,a na g e n ti ng r o u pk
is indiﬀerent between joining platform i and joining neighbor platform i +
1i fpi
k + tkxk − bkni
j = p
i+1
k + tk(1/m − xk) − bkn
i+1
j . Note that there is
another neighbor platform i − 1 and the associated indiﬀerence condition
holds. Suppose that price ˜ pk is set by platforms other than i,a n de a c h
platform other than i, i +1 ,a n di − 1h a s1 /m market share. The number
of agents k who join platform i + 1 is therefore: n
i+1
k =( 1 /m − xk)+1 /2m.
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B − f, (2)
where ck > 0 is constant marginal cost and f>0i st h eﬁxed cost associated
with setting up a platform. Substituting (2) with (1), and maximizing (2)
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We assume the following inequality to satisfy the second-order condition,7





j)]/(tktj −4bkbj) due to the fact that the competing platforms at the two
marginal agents are the same.
7This is similar to Armstrong (2006), (2tS +2tB)2 −16tStB =( 2 tS −2tB)2 ≥ 0, (2tS +
316tStB > 9(bS +bB)2. In a symmetric equilibrium, each platform charges the
same price for each group pi
k =˜ pk = pk, rewriting the ﬁrst-order conditions,












The following proposition derives from these conditions.
PROPOSITION 1 If each agent contracts with a platform, there is a sym-
metric equilibrium. Symmetric equilibrium prices and the proﬁta r e :














2tS +2 tB − 3bS − 3bB
2m2 − f. (5)
The equilibrium prices (4) and those in Armstrong (2006) share similar
features.8 However, there are two big diﬀerences between his model and
ours, which are the number of marginal agents and the degree of competition
stemming from the number of platforms. To see the diﬀerences between
these models, let us rescale the circumference of the circle in order to have
each platform locates at one unit of length from the neighboring platform.
Therefore, the circumference is equal to the number of platforms.9 Now,
consider the case of two platforms on the circle, and suppose platform 1
obtains a seller from platform 2.10 Then, by the cross-group network eﬀects,
the utility of each buyer in platform 1 increases by bB but that in platform 2
decreases by the same amount. The same utility change occurs in Armstrong,
but its implication about pricing is diﬀerent, since each platform has two
marginal buyers in our model. The inﬂuence of cross-group network eﬀects
on our equilibrium prices with two platforms is twice as much as that on
Armstrong. Next, consider the case of three or more platforms on the circle,
and suppose platform i obtains a seller from platform i +1 . P l a t f o r mi
competes with the two neighboring platforms, i +1a n di − 1, on the circle.
The utility change for buyers between platform i and i+1 is similar to that in
two-platform case. However, the utility change of buyers between platform i
and i − 1 is half, since the number of sellers in platform i − 1 is unchanged.
This is why the inﬂuence of cross-group network eﬀects on our equilibrium
2tB)2 ≥ 16tStB > 9(bS +bB)2. Therefore, 2tS +2tB −3bS −3bB > 0. 16tStB −36bSbB >
9(bS +bB)2−36bSbB,4 ( 4 tStB −9bSbB) > 9(bS −bB)2 ≥ 0. Therefore, 4tStB −9bSbB > 0.
8Armstrong shows the equilibrium price of agent k as pk = ck + tk − bj,i nh i sm o d e l
of Hotelling-type two-platform competition.
9Making this adjustment for (4), new equilibrium prices become pk = ck + tk − 3bj/2.
10In two-platform competition with rescaling, the equilibrium prices are pk = ck + tk −
2bj, due to the diﬀerence in the demand function. See footnote 6.
4prices with three or more platforms is one and a half times as much as that
on Armstrong.
If cross-group network eﬀects disappear from our model, a platform faces
two independent circular cities. The equilibrium price and proﬁta r et h es a m e
as Salop’s (1979) model,11 which are pk = ck +tk/m and π =( tS +tB)/m2 −
f. Compared with (4) and (5), the equilibrium prices and proﬁti nt w o -
sided markets are decreased by the cross-group network eﬀects. Cross-group
network eﬀects promote competition among platforms.12
We consider another pricing mechanism, in which platforms maximize
proﬁt when a price for one group is restricted by a minimum (or maximum)
price, ˆ pk. A typical example of minimum prices is a non-negative price. In
free magazines or yellow pages, levying charges for readers is not feasible.13
The following proposition derives from these conditions.
PROPOSITION 2 When the price of a seller is restricted,14 symmetric
equilibrium prices and the proﬁto fp l a t f o r ma r e :













4tStB − 9bSbB − 2(2tS − 3bS)(cS − ˆ pS)m
4tSm2 − f. (7)
In Proposition 1, if platform i collects a large proﬁtf r o mb u y e r sb yo b -
taining a seller, platform i sets a negative price for sellers and a high price for
buyers. Suppose a seller’s price is bound by a minimum price. Each platform
can not attract sellers by lowering prices for this restriction. Platforms re-
duce prices for buyers in order to attract sellers through cross-group network
eﬀects. Whether each platform’s proﬁt increases depends on the relative size
of the proﬁt increase from sellers and the proﬁt decrease from buyers.
In equilibrium, market shares of platform i are 1/m. We therefore com-
pare proﬁts with and without restriction, by comparing the sum of equilib-
rium prices. We deﬁne buyer price with a restriction, (6), as ¯ pB. Subtracting
the sum of equilibrium prices without the restriction from that with the re-
striction equals (ˆ pS+¯ pB)−(pS+pB)=( 1−3bS/2tS)(ˆ pS−pS). If the number
of obtainable sellers when a platform obtains a buyer is larger than one, prof-
its with the minimum (maximum) price restriction are smaller (respectively,
11Navon et al. (1995) investigates Salop’s (1979) model by using one group of agents
with network eﬀects.
12The equilibrium is not inﬂuenced by the common beneﬁt as in Salop (1979).
13Rysman (2004) shows an empirical analysis for the yellow page market.
14We focus on a restriction on sellers. We can discuss a restriction on buyers accordingly.
5larger) than that without the restriction. Otherwise, proﬁts with the mini-
mum (maximum) price restriction are larger (respectively, smaller) than that
without the restriction.
We focus on the case in which the number of obtainable sellers when a
platform obtains a buyer is larger than one. When sellers are bound by a
minimum price, platform proﬁts from sellers increase. On the other hand,
platforms actively compete for buyers because a platform obtains more than
one seller when the platform obtains a buyer. A decrease in proﬁts from
b u y e r si sl a r g e rt h a na ni n c r e a s ei np r o ﬁts from sellers. Therefore, platform
proﬁts with the restriction are smaller than that without the restriction.15
Consider how proﬁt responds to a change in the restriction of prices,
∂ˆ π/∂ˆ pS =( 2 tS −3bS)/2tSm. Therefore, when cross-group network eﬀects of
sellers are larger than transportation costs of sellers, platform proﬁts decrease
with the restriction of prices.
3F r e e e n t r y
Each potential platform decides whether to enter in the ﬁrst stage. If a
platform enters the market, it obtains at least zero proﬁt. In this section,
we primarily consider the case in which the price for sellers is restricted, but
we discuss the case without the restriction at the end of this section. Let ˆ m
denote the number of platforms under free entry. 16
The socially optimal number of platforms is deﬁned by the number of
platforms to maximize social welfare, which is:











+aB − cB − mf.
Note that entry dilutes contributions of the cross-group network eﬀects to the
social welfare. Maximizing the social welfare with respect to m, ∂W/∂m =
(tS + tB − 4bS − 4bB)/4m2 − f.W h e ntS + tB − 4bS − 4bB > 0, the socially
optimal number of platforms m∗ is: m∗ =[ ( tS +tB −4bS −4bB)/4f]1/2. The
socially optimal number of platforms increases with transportation costs and
15When sellers are bound by a maximum price, platform proﬁts from sellers decrease,
whereas platforms attract additional sellers. Platforms can levy additional fees on buyers
by adapting to the growth of sellers. Cross-group network eﬀects of sellers intensify proﬁts
from buyers. Under these conditions, an increase in platform proﬁts from buyers is larger
than a decrease in platform proﬁts from sellers. Therefore, proﬁts with the restriction are
larger than that without the restriction.
16Note that ˆ m has real roots because 4tStB −9bSbB > 0. We neglect to discuss the case
in which the number of entrants becomes an integer.
6decreases with cross-group network eﬀects and ﬁxed costs.17
Consider how many platforms can enter the market when the price is
not restricted. Using (5), the number of platforms under free entry is m =
[(2tS+2tB−3bS−3bB)/2f]1/2 >m ∗. Therefore, free entry yields excess entry,
because an entering platform harms the proﬁt of other platforms. This result
is an extension of Salop (1979) and Navon et al. (1995).
We now consider the inﬂuence of cross-group network eﬀects on excess en-
try. From the above formula, it is straightforward that the numbers of ﬁrms
in the social optimum and under free entry, m∗ and m, both decrease in the
cross-group network eﬀects, and thus those numbers themselves provide poor
i n f o r m a t i o no nt h ei n ﬂu e n c e . F o rab e t t e re v a l u a t i o no nt h ei n ﬂuence, we
propose the ratio18 m/m∗. Importantly, this ratio is independent of the entry
cost f, so that we can always adjust the entry cost to normalize m∗ without
aﬀecting the ratio. Direct calculation shows the ratio is increasing in b’s;
the cross-group network eﬀects intensify the degree of excess entry.19 This
is because, in addition to the well-known business stealing eﬀect identiﬁed
in Salop, negative externalities of entry on the incumbents’ proﬁts due to
diluting the cross-group network eﬀects make entry further socially undesir-
able. Accordingly, the degree of excesse n t r yi no u rm o d e li ss e v e r e rt h a ni n
Salop.20
When the price is restricted, to compare the number of platforms under
free entry with the social optimum, denoted by ∆, the diﬀerence between the




− ˆ π = −




(ˆ pS − pS). (8)
The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of (8) is comprised of the increase in
social welfare when a platform enters the market, as well as a portion of
proﬁts unaﬀected by the restriction. Note 16tStB > 9(bS +bB)2,3 tS +3tB −
2bS − 2bB > 0. The second term of the right-hand side of (8) denotes the
diﬀerence between proﬁts with the price restriction and without the price
restriction. Therefore, the following proposition is:
PROPOSITION 3 Under free entry, if the minimum or maximum price
binds, when ∆ > 0, the number of platforms is smaller than the social op-
17If tS +tB −4bS −4bB < 0, note that the socially optimal number of platforms is one.
However, we focus on the case where tS + tB − 4bS − 4bB > 0.
18The ratio is [2(2tS +2 tB − 3bS − 3bB)/(tS + tB − 4bS − 4bB)]1/2 > 2.
19Diﬀerentiating the ratio with respect to the cross-group network eﬀects, 5(tS +
tB)/(tS + tB − 4bS − 4bB)[2(2tS +2 tB − 3bS − 3bB)(tS + tB − 4bS − 4bB)]1/2 > 0.
20We can integrate Salop’s model into ours by setting t = tS +tB and bS = bB =0 . The
ratio in Salop is 2.
7timum. When ∆ < 0, the number of platforms is larger than the social
optimum.
proof: When the marginal social beneﬁt is positive at the number of platforms
under free entry ∂W/∂m−f>0, additional entry is needed to improve social
welfare. But an extra platform does not enter because ˆ π−f<0u n d e r∆ > 0.
Excess entry result can be proven accordingly. ˙
When the price is not bound by the restriction (for example a minimum
price), we have excess entry result. However, we show that too few platforms
enter the market under conditions of the minimum price. When the price
for sellers is bound by the minimum price, the proﬁt from sellers increase
and the proﬁt from buyers decrease. When the proﬁt increase from sellers
is smaller than the proﬁt decrease from buyers, the number of platforms
with the restriction decreases compared with the number of platforms with
restriction. If the cross-group network eﬀects of sellers are suﬃciently large,
platforms earn considerably low proﬁts because platforms actively compete
for buyers. An entering platform cannot suﬃciently steal business from other
platforms. Therefore, the number of entering platforms is smaller than the
social optimum.21
If we set the minimum or maximum price on Salop (1979), there is the
case where too few ﬁrms enter the market. However, the restriction is limited
to a price cap. The minimum price increases the number of entrants and
enforces excess entry, because the minimum price relaxes price competition.
Meanwhile, when the price for sellers is bound by the minimum price, we show
that too few platforms enter the market compared with the social optimum.
Fierce price competition for buyers brings the proﬁt down, if the cross-group
network eﬀects of sellers are suﬃciently large.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We investigate a model of multiple platforms competition in a circular city.
If a minimum (maximum) price binds and the cross-group network eﬀects
are suﬃciently large for a group of agents, the proﬁts of a platform with a
price restriction is lower (higher) than that without a price restriction. As
a result, the number of platforms is smaller (respectively, larger) than the
social optimum.
21If the price for sellers are bound by the maximum price, proﬁts from sellers decrease,
whereas proﬁts from buyers increase. If the cross-group network eﬀects of sellers are
suﬃciently small, the proﬁt increase from buyers is very few because competition for
buyers without the restriction is inactive. Therefore, the number of platforms is smaller
than the social optimum.
8In our model, platforms charge subscription fees to agents. However,
platforms may use more complicated pricing rules. Shopping malls (buyers
and shops) demonstrate an example. Buyers usually do not pay a price to
go into a shopping mall. On the other hand, sellers pay the shopping mall
to set up shops. Shopping malls aggressively compete on prices charged to
sellers when buyers value the number of sellers. However, shopping malls
may charge a price per transaction. Extending our model to include per-
transaction prices would be an interesting topic for future research.
We take a preliminary step in analyzing multiple platform competition
when agents join only one platform. In reality, agents join multiple platforms
in order to interact with more customers. For example, ﬁrms may post
multiple magazines in order to attract more potential employees, and workers
may subscribe to multiple magazines in order to ﬁnd a better job. Armstrong
(2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007) consider the multi-home problem
in their two-platform competition model. However, there are some diﬃculties
in extending our model to the multi-home problem. The multi-home problem
should thus be undertaken in future research.
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